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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a modification of the
RPL routing protocol by introducing the SISLOF Objective
Function ensuring that only motes that share a suitable key
can join the RPL routing table. This will ensure that all IoT
network motes connect in a secure method. SISLOF uses the
concept of key pre-distribution proposed by Eschenauer and
Gligor in the context of the Internet of Things. First, we discuss
related work that provide evidence that the key pre-distribution
scheme in the context of the IoT with default RPL metrics fails
to achieve the full network connectivity using the same ring
size, however full time connectivity can be achieved but with
a great cost in term of the large rings sizes. We introduce
the SISLOF Objective Function and explain the modification
it does to the RPL messages (DIO and DAO). We finally show
the performance of the key pre-distribution in the context of
the Internet of Things when SISLOF is used as the Objective
Function of the RPL routing protocol.
Keywords-Internet of Things; Security; RPL; Objective
Function;
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of things that are
connected to the Internet, anytime, anywhere. It integrates
sensors and devices into everyday objects that are connected
to the Internet over fixed and wireless networks.
The Internet of Things will be made possible by using IP
based network such as the IPv6 Low Wireless Personal Area
Network (6LoWPAN). It is a simple low cost communica-
tion network that allows wireless connectivity in applications
with limited power and relaxed throughput requirements [1].
The 6LoWPAN concept originated from the idea that “the
Internet Protocol should be applied to low-power devices to
participate in the Internet of Things [2].
The purpose of this paper is to propose an Objective
Function (OF) called Shared Identifier Secure Link OF
(SISLOF) for the Routing Protocol for Low Power and
Lossy Networks that only adds to its routing table motes
that share a key and thus can securley communicate.
The distribution of the keys to be used by SISLOF is based
on Laurent Eschenauer and Virgil D. Gligor’s Algorithm [3]
for Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN). We implement it in
the context of 6LoWPAN Devices for the IoT. We provide
an analysis of the performance of the SISLOF. We also
compare its performance with the performance of the key
pre distribution algorithm in the context of IoT with the
default RPL routing metrics and in the context of DSN.
Section 2 provides an introduction to the Internet of
Things, the 6LoWPAN network protocol, the IPv6 Routing
Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) and
several solutions that attempts to secure the Internet of
Things. Section 3 presents the key pre-distribution algorithm
by Eschenauer and Gligor in [3] in the context of IoT when
using the minimum ETX value (Default RPL metric) as in
[4]. In section 4, we present the proposed SISLOF OF. In
section 5 we provide an overview of the experiments setup
and parameters used. In section 6 we provide an evaluation
of the performance of SISLOF and how it compared with
previous experiments. Finally, we present our main conclu-
sions in Section 6.
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE
Routing is a fundamental piece of the overall IPv6
architecture for the Internet of Things, and the Routing
Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks, standardised
as the the IPv6 routing protocol, is designed for large scale
implementation of IPv6 in harsh environments that will
translate the potential of Internet of Things into reality [5].
RPL organises its topology in a Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG). An RPL DAG must have at least one RPL root and a
Destination Oriented DAG (DODAG) is constructed for each
root. The root acts as a sink for the topology by storing all
routes to all motes in the DODAG in the routing table [6].
For a DODAG to be constructed, the root will need first
to broadcast a DODAG Information Object (DIO) message
to all motes. The DIO message contains the DAG Metric
Container option that is used to report metrics along the
DODAG. Multiple metrics can be defined by an OF [6].
The OF is identified by an Objective Code Point (OCP)
within the DIO Configuration option. An OF defines how
motes translate one or more metrics and constraints, which
are themselves defined in [7], into a value called Rank,
which approximates the mote’s distance from a DODAG
root in term of the number of hops it needs to reach
it. An OF also defines how motes select parents. When
a new DIO is received, the OF that corresponds to the
Objective Code Point (OCP) in the DIO is triggered with the
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content of the DIO. For example, OF0 [8] is identified by
OCP0 by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
The Minimum Rank with Hysteresis Objective Function
(MRHOF) [9] is another OF defined by IANA and given
the identifier OCP1.
Security specifically is a major issue as IEEE802.15.4
mandates link-layer security based on AES, but it omits any
details about topics like bootstrapping, key management, and
security at higher layers.
Security is Providing key management for confidentiality
and group level authentication in a sensor network. The main
challenge in public key algorithms when using in the context
of Internet of Things, similarly to sensor networks, is the
energy consumption of exchanging public key certificates
[10] [11].
Key management protocols can be divided into three cate-
gories. Arbitrated keying protocols, Self Enforcing protocols
and Pre-Deployed Keying protocols. Arbitrated keying pro-
tocols such as [12] and [13] are not suitable in the context
of the Internet of Things because of the capabilities of
sensor motes and leave the network vulnerable to man in
the middle attacks. Self Enforcing protocols such as [14] to
secure IoT was suggested to provide a lighter and robust
security protocol using pairwise key establishment between
motes however the communication overhead was consider-
ably large. In the next section we show how the management
scheme for Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN) proposed by
Eschenauer and Gligor in [3] was used in the context of the
IoT with the default RPL routing metric, the minimum ETX.
III. PREVIOUS WORK
A. Key pre-Distribution Scheme
Offline Key pre-distribution algorithm for DSN proposed
in [3] describes the method by which keys are distributed to
motes in the network. This key pre-distribution mechanism
ensures that for each direct link between any two motes in
the network, the probability of those two sharing at least a
key is 0.5. Using Stirling approximation, the authors of [3]
concluded that the size of key rings KR does not need to be
large in order for a network to guarantee full connectivity
and only 50% of those motes need to have a shared key. An
example in [3] showed that when a pool contained 100 000
keys, full network connectivity was achieved with only 75
keys in the rings.
This scheme was used in [4] in order to determine if it
produces full connectivity in the context of the Internet of
Things.
1) A large pool P of keys K are generated with their
identifiers ID.
2) The Ring Size RS is equal for both keys rings
KR[RS] and identifiers rings IR[RS].
3) Each identifier in ID[RS] is of size b bits.
4) A mote send its identifier IRs to another mote to
establish if common identifiers exist with the receiver’s
identifier ring IRr.
5) If a common identifier is found, the receiver sends
back an acknowledgement with the identifier number
i.e. “IDs[3]′′ to represent the third identifier in the
identifier ring of the sender IDs.
6) Once the sender receives the acknowledgement con-
taining the common identifier found, a secure link is
established using the key related to the identifier.
B. Performance of the Key Pre distribution Scheme in the
context of the IoT with RPL using the Minimum ETX metric
Following the simulation of the Key Pre-distribution
Scheme in [11] in the context of the Distributed Sensor
Networks and using the minimum ETX value as the RPL
metric to choose the preferred parent, the results of the
simulation experiments showed that out of each pool used,
only half of the leaves in the routing table shared a key. The
other half was excluded from the RPL routing table. For
example, the percentage of motes in the DODAG that has
a shared key was 54.01% when the ring size RS was 25
keys in a pool P that contained a 1000 keys and a network
of 1000 motes. Only when the ring size was increased to
77 keys that the full network connectivity was achieved and
all motes in the network were included in the RPL routing
table.
IV. SISLOF
The Shared Identifier Secure Link Objective Function
(SISLOF) is our proposed OF to find secure links (those
that share an identifier) between any mote and all of its
candidate parents to form a secure RPL routing table while
minimising the number of motes that are excluded because
of insecure links.
SISLOF will attempt to find shared keys between motes
by using the Key pre-distribution algorithm for Distributed
Sensor Networks proposed in [3]. This will allow the for-
mation of an RPL routing table that only contains secured
links between motes.
A. Aims and Objectives
The aim of SISLOF is to create a secure RPL routing table
with as many motes as possible. Specifically, its objectives
are:
• Only motes that share a key can become a leaf in the
DODAG tree.
• Nodes that do not share a key with their selected
parent will discard this selection and try to form a
leaf with one of the other motes that received its DIO
(Neighbouring motes).
• If one mote shares a key with two or more motes, it
will select as the preferred parent the mote that has a
better ETX value in order to form the leaf between the
two motes.
Figure 1. Addition to the DIO message: 1 byte for each of the variables,
Ring Size (RS),identifier size (b), Number of identifiers in one message
(NI) , Number of Sequence (NS) and Sequence Number (SN). IDSN for
the number of identifiers sent in the message.
B. SISLOF Metrics
SISLOF uses two types of metrics in its process to
compute the preferred parent for a mote. First it uses our
new mote metric object called Shared Identifiers State (SIS)
to compare two arrays of identifiers in order to determine if
one or more shared identifier exist.
If the mote that received the DIO determines that it shares
one or more identifiers with two or more motes, that mote
will need to choose which of the motes that sent the DIO
will be selected as the preferred parent. SISLOF will thus
need to decide between the motes it shares a key with. This
will require SISLOF to use a link metric object as a second
criterion in order to select the preferred parent. SISLOF will
use the ETX Reliability object to select the preferred parent.
The ETX value is calculated for each link from which a DIO
message was received and with which it shares one or more
identifiers. The mote that has the lowest ETX value will be
selected as the preferred parent. The ETX is the number
of transmissions the mote expects to make to a destination
in order to successfully deliver the packet. This will also
require changing the ‘A’ field of the header to 7 for each
message (this field is given to indicate that the header will
report a minimum or a maximum) [7].
Below is an explanation of the RPL messages modifica-
tions to incorporate the metrics required for the Key pre-
distribution scheme by Eschenauer and Gligor in [3] as
proposed by [4].
C. Message and Modifications
SISLOF will require the modification of the DIO and
DAO RPL messages in order to encapsulate the various
variables of SISLOF required to exchange identifier rings
and look for a common one. Those variables will be either
encapsulated in the DIO message sent to a mote or in the
DAO message replying.
SISLOF variables shown in Fig. 1 and explained in Table
I are composed mainly of identifiers and other values related
to the segmentation of those identifiers. To incorporate the
SISLOF variables shown in Table I in a DIO message, the
6LoWPAN message, the ICMPv6 control message and the
DIO base object requires 89 bytes [15] which implies that
there are 38 bytes in the data frame to be used to embed
in frame variables related to SISLOF . In Fig. 1 RS and b
are selected to fulfil requirements of the algorithm of [3].
NI provides the number of identifiers that can fit in the
DIO payload. NI is calculated as the rounded integer of
the available payload (33 bytes) divided by the identifier size
b. NS is the total number of messages required to transmit
the complete identifier ring. NS is calculated as the quotient
of RS divided by NI . Finally SN identifies the order of
the specific message in the complete sequence of messages
required to disseminate the identifier ring. It is calculated as
the sequence index corresponding to the current message.
Table I
IDENTIFIER TRANSMISSION CONFIGURATION OPTIONS USED FOR
TRANSFERING SISLOF MESSAGES IN DIO AND DAO.
Variable Name of Field Size in bytes
RS Ring Size 1 byte
b Identifier Size 1 byte
NI Number of identifiers in one message 1 byte
NS The Total Number of Sequences 1 byte
SN The Sequence Number 1 byte
To encapsulate as many identifiers as possible in each
DIO message, variables size in bytes are kept to the
minimum by giving only 1 byte for each variable as shown
in Table I. This means that each variable can have any value
between 0 to 255 in decimal. Several factors were behind
choosing these values. From experiments we did and using
the same technique used in [3] with a 2500 mote network
and the Ring Size RS that we used was 41 keys/identifiers
for each ring. Using the same formula in [3] with the same
network size and Pool size, the ring size for a network of
100 000 motes will be 250 keys. It can be represented in a
1 byte field. We have also used an Identifier Size of 1 byte.
Using 1 byte for the Identifiers is more than enough, since
the identifier is not used to encrypt the message and it is
only used to identify if a common key exists between two
motes. Using both RS and b will not yield a number of
identifiers in one message larger than 256. In our example,
using the same number of motes as [3] will yield one
identifier NI per each message, that is 250 messages or the
total number of sequences NS. The sequence number SN
will of course be smaller than NS as it is a counter that
will determine the sequence number of a specific message.
DAO messages takes 69 bytes as per [8]. This leaves us
with 58 bytes in the data frame that we used to embed frames
related to our OF used as below and shown in Fig. 2. SN
is the sequence number received in the corresponding DIO.
NI is a bitmap with bits set to 1 if the identifier with the
corresponding position is available in the identifier ring of
the mote that received the DIO message and 0 otherwise 1.
The DAO messages sent upward by each node that received
the DIO is shown in Algorithm 1.
1NI size is variable and changes depending on the size of each identifier.
Figure 2. Addition to the DAO message. 1 byte for Sequence Number
(SN) and NI , the bitmap representing shared identifiers bits.
D. Securing the link
A mote that is propagating the DODAG information,
broadcasts the DIO message downwards. The DIO message
will contain all information related to 6LoWPAN messages
such as the IPv6 header, etc. On top of that, the DIO message
will also contain its rank with the root. SISLOF addition
to the DIO message, explained in Fig. 1 will contain the
identifiers of the first DIO frame from the sequence of
frames (NS).
One of the constraint variables that is required by the
SISLOF is the shared identifier constraint. The calculation of
this variable will produce a secure or insecure link. This vari-
able will determine whether a mote is considered a secure
candidate parent or not. This is the first constraint/criterion
that SISLOF computes before moving to other variables to
calculate the path between motes and the root and form the
RPL routing table.
Each mote that receives a DIO message replies back with
the DAO message the 6LoWPAN header. On top of that,
the DAO message will also contain the SISLOF additions
explained in Fig. 2.
Each node that receives a DIO message replies back with
the DAO message that contains as of Fig. 4, all information
related to 6LoWPAN message such as IPv6 header, etc. On
top of that, the DAO message will also contain the SISLOF
objective function additions explained in Fig. 2 The DAO
messages sent upward by each node that received the DIO
is shown in Algorithm 1.
The sequence diagram shown in Fig. 3 shows the various
control messages and variables exchanged between two
nodes in order to determine if a common identifier exists.
After a common identifier is found, SISLOF will then
compute the link metrics and the parent ETX in order to
choose the preferred parent.
E. Link Metrics and parent ETX calculation.
If one or more secure mote that received the DIO
identified that a shared identifier exist then the expected
Transmission Count metric (ETX of the parent), similarly
to the ETX calculation of RPL link metrics in [7], will
become the second criteria on deciding the best parent. This
metric will return the values of the DIO origin mote ETX
(parent_metric) and its received metric instance_etx.
From these two variables the link metric can be calculated
to return the ETX of the link link_metric [15].
Input :
• DIO message (DIOSN )
DIOSN=(n, b, IRSN , NI , NS, SN )
• Identifier Ring of Receiver IRr
IRr =
[
ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, . . . ID(n−1), IDn
]
• Ring Size (RS)
Output :
• Shared identifiers bits (SIBSN )
SIBSN =
[




• Shared Identifier State (SIS)
SIS =
[








for w = 0 to RS − 1 do
for y = 0 to NI − 1 do
for z = 0 to RS − 1 do
if IRSN [y] = IRr[z] then
Append 0 To SIBSN ;
SIS[w] = 0 ;
else
Append 1 To SIBSN ;




AddtoDictionary DAOSN (SIBSN "Shared
Identifiers bits", (SN ) "Sequence Number" );
Send DAOSN upward to DIO Sender ;
Algorithm 1: DAO Messages Algorithm
DAO messages each a reply to a DIO message from the
sequence it receives, contains a bitmap stream of bits
representing either a value of 1 for a shared identifier and
a value of 0 for a not shared identifier in SIBSN for all
identifiers in the ring of the receive mote.
V. EXPERIMENT SETUP AND PARAMETERS
Similarly to the experiments carried on in [4] and [11],
the experiments were simulated using the Cooja application
in the Contiki Operating System.
A C program was coded to implement the key pre-
distribution algorithm of [3]. This resulted in the generation




Run Loop SN < NS
Figure 3. SISLOF Sequence Diagram
diovariables*: RI , IS, Num.Of.Seq , Num.Of.Iden, IDSN [], Seq.Num
daovariables**: Seq.Num,NISN [], ETX
of Keys Pool, IDs pool, Key rings and ID rings 2.
The parameters used in the SISLOF experiment are the
same as in [4] and [11]. The overall area of the simulation
was kept to 250x250 meters, a typical size of a medium
size university 3. The transmitting range for each mote is
set to 50 meters (this is the common transmitting range for
6LoWPAN low power devices). We also used the key length
klength of 64 bits and the ID length ilength of 32 bits.v
The Pool size P for both keys and identifiers is the first
parameter. The pools size we run simulations for are: 100,
250, 500, 750, 1 000 and 2 500 motes. The second parameter
is the network size N .
In this paper we are looking at the maximum number of
motes as it is an important factor to determine the number
of keys shared between motes in comparison to it. The third
parameter is the ring size RS For each pool size (P), keys
and identifiers and to ensure the accuracy of experiment
simulations, each experiment was run 5 times with the
largest and smallest results discarded and the average of
the remaining three runs used. In our experiments, if this
node does not share a key with its preferred parent, then
the link between those two nodes does not exist. Therefore
the node will not be in the routing table and any sub leaves
will also be discarded. In addition to this, when simulating
smaller number and given that the simulation area is not
changed, the number Percentage of Shared Keys (SK %) for
10 or 25 motes in the network is low as motes are unable to
communicate with each other since the network motes are
sparse.
VI. RESULTS
The proposed Objective Function SISLOF was simulated
using the the parameters explained in the previous section.
This presented us with three different sets of experiments,
2Different random generators were used for keys, IDS and pools [4]
3Birkbeck, University of London [11]
Table II
COMPARISON TABLE SHOWING PRECENTAGE OF SHARED KEYS (SK%)
WHEN ORIGINAL RING SIZE (RS) AND NETWORK SIZE (N) ARE USED,
WHEN MINIMUM ETX METRIC IS USED AND WHEN SISLOF METRICS
ARE USED.
Original values ExperimentMinimum ETX metric [4] SISLOF
N RS SK % RS SK % RS SK %
100 8 50.52 23 100 12 100
250 13 50.43 36 100 20 100
500 18 57.14 48 100 28 100
750 22 49.47 63 100 38 100
1000 25 57.14 77 100 40 100
2500 41 48.19 104 100 60 100
the first in [4] where the pre key distribution scheme was
simulated in the context of Wireless Sensor Networks. The
second in [11] where the scheme was simulated in the
context of the IoT using the default RPL routing metric, the
Minimum Expected Transmission Count ETX. The third is
the simulation where the scheme is simulated in the context
of the IoT using SISLOF for RPL. The number of keys in
the ring size RS for each of the three set of experiments is
shown in Table II below with the percentage of Shared Keys
(SK %) between motes that formed leaves in the routing
table.
From Table II, we can notice that the ring sizes in DSN
was quite low in comparison with the ring sizes for IoT when
the Minimum ETX metric was used. However it is also clear
that the ring sizes when SISLOF is used, is around 55% less
then when RPL was using with the ETX metric. From Fig. 4,
we can observe the performance of the key pre-distribution
using the three experiment sets results presented in the table.
The key-pre-distribution in the DSN networks presented the
lowest ring sizes and the IoT using the Minimum ETX
metric for RPL showed the highest ring sizes.
Wireless Sensor Networks required the smallest ring sizes
to achieve full connectivity simply because in DSN a mote
that do not share a key with one of its neighbours can send
data to that specific neighbour indirectly through another
mote and thus the full network connectivity is achieved even
if not all motes share keys.
The ring size needed to achieve full connectivity when
RPL was used with its default minimum ETX metric was the
largest because only motes that share a key can participate in
the RPL routing table. Nodes that did not share key could not
communicate. By increasing the size of the ring, we ensured
in [11] that all motes can join the RPL routing table and thus
communicate.
From [4] and [11], we identified that 104 keys and identi-
fiers in the rings was needed to achieve a 100% guaranteed
connectivity in the network comparison with only 60 keys
when SISLOF was used. Using the parameters we explained
in section 5, we can conclude that the key ring and the
identifier ring in each mote for a network of 2 500 motes will
Figure 4. Comparison of the rings sizes used in Key Pre Distribution
Scheme (DSN, IoT and RPL with SISLOF).
take up around 0.72kb. This is an actual saving of nearly
50% in term of capacity in comparison with the required
storage of 1.38 kb for a 104 key ring and a 104 identifier
ring. In this experiment, we have used Zolertia mote Z1
which features a 92KB Flash memory. This means that more
than 90 kB of Flash memory is still free to use for other
applications. Using the calculation as of [3], we can expect
the ring sizes for 100 000 to be in the region of 2400. This
will require around 28.8 kB of Flash memory.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this document we proposed Shared the Identifier Secure
Link Objective Function (SISLOF), an Objective Function
that identifies motes that share a secure links in the network
and uses secure links as the first criterion for calculating the
RPL routing table.
We have investigated the performance of SISLOF and its
impact on the security of an Internet of Things network.
The results of the rings sizes in the SISLOF experiments
is clearly a lot smaller then the rings sizes in the IoT
experiments. We have provided evidence that by using
SISLOF we can secure all communications between motes
in the Internet of Things as only motes that share a key can
be joined in the routing table and thus all communications
between motes are secure.
The experiments simulated indicate that by using SISLOF,
the ring size in term of number of keys and identifiers in
comparison with the size of ring size wwhen using RPL
with minimum ETX metric was nearly half. This resulted
in a reduction of storage compairson to nearly half as well.
Those savings will also have a direct impact on the power
consumption. Less keys and identifiers in the ring will also
result in less messages being exchanged between motes and
thus using less battery power.
The proposed SISLOF provides evidence that it is able
to secure the IoT in an efficient way for small area such a
medium size university, however more research is required
in order to determine its suitability in term of the overhead
it generates in the network when RPL messages are propa-
gating to all motes to form the routing table and the storage
space it will consume once networks become larger. One
possible solution that is worth exploring is to have multiple
DODAGs with secure routes between roots.
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